

Emerging Trends



Bill Claycomb Lead Research Scientist - CERT Enterprise Threat and Vulnerability Management Program

Bill Claycomb is the Lead Research Scientist for the CERT Enterprise Threat and Vulnerability Management program at Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute. His primary research topic is the insider threat; current work includes discovery of insider threat behavioral patterns and corresponding sociotechnical countermeasures



Andy Moore Lead Researcher - CERT Insider Threat Center, Senior Member of the Technical Staff

Andy Moore is a lead researcher in the CERT Insider Threat Center and Senior Member of the Technical Staff at Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute. He explores ways to improve the security, survivability, and resiliency of enterprise systems through insider threat and defense modeling, incident management, and architecture engineering and analysis.

maintaining the data needed, and c including suggestions for reducing	lection of information is estimated to ompleting and reviewing the collect this burden, to Washington Headqu uld be aware that notwithstanding and DMB control number.	tion of information. Send commen larters Services, Directorate for In	ts regarding this burden estimate formation Operations and Reports	or any other aspect of the s, 1215 Jefferson Davis	his collection of information, Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington	
1. REPORT DATE 08 AUG 2013		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVE 00-00-2013	ERED 3 to 00-00-2013	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER				
Emerging Trends		5b. GRANT NUMBER				
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
				5e. TASK NUMBER		
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Carnegie Mellon University,Software Engineering Institute,Pittsburgh,PA,15213				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITO	AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAIL Approved for publ	LABILITY STATEMENT ic release; distribut	ion unlimited				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NO	OTES					
14. ABSTRACT						
15. SUBJECT TERMS						
16. SECURITY CLASSIFIC	ATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF	18. NUMBER	19a. NAME OF	
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	OF PAGES 28	RESPONSIBLE PERSON	

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Topics

- The Expanding Complexity of Insiders
- Cloud Computing
- Mobile Devices
- Social Networking and Social Engineering
- Future Threats



The Expanding Complexity of "Insiders"

The Expanding Complexity of "Insiders"

Area	Description
Collusion with outsiders	Insiders recruited by or working for outsiders, including organized crime and foreign organizations or governments
Business partners	Difficulty in controlling/monitoring access to your information and systems by "trusted" business partners
Mergers & acquisitions	Heightened risk of insider threat in organizations being merged into acquiring organization
Cultural differences	Difficulty in recognizing behavioral indicators exhibited by insiders working for US organizations who are not US citizens
Foreign allegiances	US organizations operating branches outside the US with the majority of employees who are not US citizens
Technology Advances	New and emerging technology often provides additional attack paths for insider threats that are difficult to detect




Cloud Computing and Insider **Threats**

Insider Threats in the Cloud


Identified by Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) "Top Threats to Cloud Computing, v1.0"

Malicious insider working for cloud provider

But there are other insider threats related to cloud computing...



Provider / Organization Relationship





Cloud-Related Malicious Insider Threats

Malicious Cloud Provider Employee

- Rogue Administrator
 - We've seen cases of insider threats from trusted business partners
 - True examples of cloud service providers are rare, but do exist
 - Important to weigh the risks carefully; the provider has much to lose as well

Cloud-Related Malicious Insider Threats

Malicious Local Employee

- Attacking the organization's data in the cloud
 - Example weakness: the organization may not have immediate control of data/services in the cloud
 - Effecting change quickly may be difficult
 - Example case: Email provider
 - Access control models may be different
- Using the cloud to attack the organization
 - Example weakness: the cloud is a very powerful tool; and a very powerful weapon, what if it is turned back on the org itself?

Protecting Against Malicious Insiders

- Those that exploit weaknesses in the Cloud
 - Diligence in planning during implementation, transition, migration, and maintenance of cloud services
 - Clear plans for handling incidents
 - Including authentication and authorization between org and host provider
- Those that use the Cloud against you
 - Host-based and network-based monitoring
 - Limit access to potential exfiltration resources
 - Create separate environments for external communication

Mobile Devices

Mobile Devices

- Organizations moving to a more mobile workforce
 - Remote access via smartphones and tablet computers
 - Can enhance productivity
- Features of mobile devices
 - Cameras, microphones, other apps
 - Mass storage
 - Remote access
 - Wireless capabilities (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular, ...)
- May be owned by employee or by employer
- Employees want to choose the device they use for work¹

¹ Hamblen, Matt. Workers Want to Choose Their Mobile Devices, Survey Finds. (2011). https://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9218693/Workers_want_to_choose_their_movile_devices_survey_finds



Risks of Mobile Devices

- Emerging attack platform for malicious insiders
- Employee-owned
 - Limited monitoring capabilities by the employer
 - Many different paths for data exfiltration
 - Camera and microphone
 - Remote access and other applications
 - Wireless capabilities (including those outside the ability of the organization to monitor, such as MMS)
 - Mass storage capabilities
 - May allow access to both corporate and personal email accounts
 - Unintentional data leakage via personal accounts may occur

Risks of Mobile Devices

- Employer-owned
 - Still has the capability to exfiltrate sensitive information
 - May be easier to monitor for unauthorized use
- Compromised mobile devices may allow an external attacker access to internal corporate resources
 - Possibly remote access to the user desktop
- Devices may sync data to locations with inadequate security
 - Cloud storage
 - Social media services
 - Personal computers

What You Should Do

- Organizations should strongly consider limiting remote access by mobile devices
 - At the very least, limit mobile device access/use in sensitive areas.
- If possible, allow remote access from corporate-owned devices only
- Monitor all remote access transactions as closely as possible
- Disable remote access and collect company devices immediately upon insider termination



Social Networking & Social Engineering

Social Networking

"A social network is a social structure made up of a set of social actors (such as individuals or organizations) and a set of the dyadic¹ ties between these actors." - Wikipedia

Possible areas of concern related to insider threats:

- Online Social Networking
- Non-technical Social Networking
 - Family or culture

¹ In sociology, a dyad (from Greek dýo, "two") is a group of two people, the smallest possible social group. - Wikipedia



Risks of Online Social Networking

- Personal information can be used to identify likely targets of attack within a company (i.e. for spear-phishing, etc.)
- May also help identify likely candidates for collusion
 - Disgruntled employees
- Data loss may occur intentionally or accidentally
- Employees may not realize the potential for data loss or harm to the organization
 - Social networking profiles may enable attackers to hijack user accounts
 - False information is hard to dispel¹
- Data loss may be difficult to detect

¹ Stephanie Chen, CNN. "Workplace rants on social media are headache for companies." http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/05/12/social.media.work.rants/index.html. May 12, 2010.



What Should You Do

All organizations should consider

- Establishing social media policy that defines acceptable use
- Including social media awareness training in training program
- Encouraging users to report suspicious contacts to information security team

Large organizations should consider

Monitoring use of social media across organization, as approved by legal counsel

Use Caution in Control and Monitoring

- Organizations must ensure legality of social media policies
 - From a 2012 National Labor Relation Board report¹
 - Avoid policy language that prohibits posts discussing non-public information or negative comments about employer
- Monitoring social media use should be done with caution
 - Avoid penalizing or firing employees for discussing work conditions, such as pay, online
 - Social media may inform an organization about an employee's protected status, opening the door to discrimination lawsuits
 - Some states have enacted legislation restricting employers' monitoring of employee use of social media
 - Some employers were asking for employees/candidates social networking site passwords

Other Types of Social Networking

- Organizations operating branches outside their own country must consider the insider threats posed by employees with allegiance to another country.
- Competing loyalties, coupled with the recruitment of employees in U.S. businesses by foreign nations or organizations, make the theft of intellectual property (IP) a potent threat for organizations that rely on IP for a competitive advantage
 - Many cases of IP theft in the CERT Insider Threat Database were associated with foreign social network connections.

¹ Verizon. "The 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report." http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2013_en_xg.pdf

Social Networking Wrap-Up

- See CERT's Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats,
 4th Edition, practice 18 for more info:
 - http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/12tr012.cfm

Social Engineering

- Seen in many of the cases in CERT's database
 - Fraud
 - Organized Crime
 - Sabotage
- Tactics often used¹
 - Phishing, doxing (document tracing), and watering hole attacks
- Features prominently in several recent high-profile attacks
 - Employees tricked into unlocking accounts, revealing passwords, opening infected attachments or web sites, etc.

¹ Verizon. "The 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report." http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2013_en_xg.pdf

Social Engineering

- A 2012 Ponemon study shows "Phishing & social engineering" attacks were experienced by 38% of respondents¹
- The 2013 Verizon Data Breach Report² reveals
 - 29% of breaches studied leveraged social tactics
 - A fourfold increase from 2012
 - Email (79%) and in-person (13%) were the most common vectors of social engineering attacks
 - Executives and managers were the most likely targets identified (27% total), followed by former employees (10%)

Ponemon Institute. "2012 Cost of Cyber Crime Study: United States."
 http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2012 US Cost of Cyber Crime Study FINAL6%20.pdf
 Verizon. "The 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report."
 http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp data-breach-investigations-report-2013 en xq.pdf

Future Threats

Future Threats

- New technologies that enable insider attacks
 - USB device emulators¹
- New vulnerabilities to existing (and embedded) technology
 - Eavesdropping on cell phone signal boosting devices²

 ^{1 &}quot;Hacking with Keyboard Emulators"
 http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Hacking-with-USB-keyboard-emulators-1172612.html
 2 Jim Finkle, Reuters. "Researchers hack Verizon device, turn it into mobile spy station"
 http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Hacking-with-USB-keyboard-emulators-1172612.html

Contacts

William R. Claycomb
Lead Research Scientist
- Enterprise Threat and
Vulnerability Management

Office: 412.268.8931

Email: claycomb@cert.org

Andrew P. Moore Lead Researcher

Insider Threat
 Research

Office: 412.268.5465

Email: apm@cert.org

CERT, Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University 4500 Fifth Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890

Copyright 2013 Carnegie Mellon University

This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8721-05-C-0003 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center.

Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of AFCEA or the United States Department of Defense.

NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.

This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution except as restricted below.

This material may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, and freely distributed in written or electronic form without requesting formal permission. Permission is required for any other use. Requests for permission should be directed to the Software Engineering Institute at permission@sei.cmu.edu.

Carnegie Mellon® is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by Carnegie Mellon University. DM-0000553